



The conclusion of Jonathan Pincus’ comment, ‘the search for simple but
invariably eﬃciency-improving policy rules, as well as the search for perfect
assignments of unchangeable property rights, are quests for chimeras’
(p. 625) is one which aspiring policy economists would do well to commit to
memory. Pincus’ conclusion is applicable, not only to the complex environ-
mental problems of the Murray–Darling basin, but to the great majority of
real-world policy problems.
Rather than attempt a response to all the points raised by Pincus, I would
like to respond to the points he makes about my discussion of unilateral and
reciprocal externalities. As Pincus observes, following Coase, externalities
may be unilateral in a physical sense, but the social interactions they generate
are inevitably bilateral or multilateral. Salt may ﬂow exclusively downstream,
from irrigators in New South Wales and Victoria to domestic water users in
Adelaide, but the existence of South Australian water users with constitu-
tional entitlements to water ﬂow aﬀects the management of catchments in the
upstream states.
It would be better, therefore, to distinguish between symmetrical and
asymmetrical externalities. The classic example of a symmetrical externality
is a traﬃc congestion problem. Each road user contributes to, and suﬀers
from, congestion and all users are (approximately) symmetrical. Symmetry
requires, in addition, that the set of users should be ﬁxed so that there is no
asymmetry between actual and potential users. In the ideal case of perfect
symmetry, policy options that treat all users equally, and therefore maintain
symmetry, can be ranked by the Pareto criterion. Either all users will be made
better oﬀ, or they will be made worse oﬀ.
The classic example of such a policy solution is that of a Pigovian tax on
road use, with the proceeds being distributed among users in a lump-sum
fashion. In this special case, and in real-world problems for which it is a
reasonable approximation, the Buchanan-Stubblebine critique referred to by
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most likely to be applicable to policy problems in which the crucial variable is
the total amount of water withdrawn from a given catchment. Water use has
the same eﬀect regardless of the water user, and the eﬀects of price increases
are, in many important respects, symmetrical.
By contrast, while it may be inappropriate to describe interactions between
upstream and downstream water users, or the relationship between recharge
and discharge areas in dry land salinity as ‘unilateral’, they are clearly
asymmetrical. In such cases, Pareto-improving policy options will be
particularly diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
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